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ABSTRACT 
The LIBOR and FX controversies revealed that prices and benchmarks related 
to money and currencies were highly susceptible to manipulative and collusive 
practices. The reform process since has strived to ensure that market participants and 
end-users can rely on a fair price determination process. Put differently, the 
emphasis has been on the price-aspects of LIBOR and FX. However, when studying 
market liquidity, the price always needs to be put into a broader context. This article 
uses two case studies to illustrate how ignoring other dimensions of market 
liquidity, such as volume and speed, can result in misleading assessments of the state 
of the market. At worst, it can lead to, and perhaps even sustain, an illusion of 
liquidity. This is of particular relevance for OTC markets, which ultimately 
depend on human relationships and trust. 





Prior to the discovery of manipulative and collusive practices related to LIBOR 
(London Interbank Offered Rate) and in foreign exchange (FX) markets, most 
observers viewed these benchmarks and markets as well-functioning. Why question 
the robustness of a benchmark underpinning derivatives contracts amounting to 
hundreds of trillions of U.S. dollars, or, in the case of FX, a market with a daily 
turnover of more than $5 trillion? 1  Such perceptions, however, turned out to be 
misplaced. Instead, a widespread culture of misconduct was discovered, which 
resulted in a number of regulatory settlements, lawsuits and criminal proceedings.  
 
An array of changes has been introduced since – ranging from stricter regulation to 
enhanced compliance procedures within banks. In short, the ‘scandals’ acted as 
triggers to inject markets and benchmarks related to money and currencies with 
greater professionalism. After all, market participants and end-users ought to be able 
to expect a fair and robust process in the generation of prices and benchmarks.  
 
Put differently, the emphasis in this process has to make prices in FX markets less 
prone to abuse. The same logic has been applied to LIBOR and other benchmarks, in 
the way they are used as prices. However, although the price-element of a market is 
essential, it is far from everything. Crucially, when studying the liquidity of a market, 
prices have to be put into a broader context. Recent anecdotal evidence from trading 
floors illustrates this. A comment from a money market trader that “LIBOR is just a 
made-up number” does not suggest that the benchmark continues to be manipulated. 
It does, however, seriously question the underlying liquidity of the market, which 
LIBOR is supposed to reflect. A remark by an FX spot trader that “the market moves 
as soon as you try to deal” should not be understood as if someone has shared 
confidential information that could result in front-running of limit orders. Instead, it 
suggests that the rise of algorithmic trading has transformed the way human traders 
assess market liquidity.  
 
This article uses two case studies to illustrate why it is necessary to go beyond the 
standard focus on price and price-based liquidity.   
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THE FIXATION ON PRICE-BASED LIQUIDITY 
 
There are many definitions of market liquidity. However, the most widely known is 
probably that by Kyle (1985), who approaches market liquidity from three 
dimensions2:  
 
•    Price (how much does it cost to turn around a position over a short period of 
time?)  
•    Volume (how much can be bought and sold without moving the price?)  
•    Speed (how long does it take for the price to recover after a “shock”?).  
 
In a liquid market, therefore, transactions costs are low even for relatively large 
quantities. What is more, market-moving transactions are less likely to have a lasting 
impact on the price.  
 
Of these, the price-dimension, typically proxied by the bid-ask spread, is the by far 
most popular measurement of market liquidity. 3  This is logical. In standard 
Economics and Finance theory, price rather than quantity (let alone speed or time) 
tends to be the key focal point when studying markets and voluntary exchange. Data 
availability is also important. In most financial markets, there is an abundance of 
tradable or indicative price quotes. Detailed and frequent information regarding actual 
transactions or limit order volume, however, is much more difficult to obtain. This is 
particularly true in over-the-counter (OTC) markets, such as FX, money or derivatives 
markets linked to these. Consequently, end-users and other observers often have to 
rely on indicative price quotes rather than firm and transparent submissions on 
exchanges and electronic trading platforms. These then form the basis for creating a 
proxy for market liquidity. 
 
Financial benchmarks like LIBOR or the WM/Reuters 4 p.m. fix are also treated as 
‘prices’, although they are not assets that can be bought or sold. The Financial 
Services Act 2012 defines a benchmark as an ‘index, rate or price that is determined 
from time to time by reference to the state of the market […]’.4  Here, too, the 
emphasis lies on the price-like element of financial benchmarks. The state of the 
market and the relevant time are necessary ingredients but remain secondary to the 
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index, rate or price that is being generated. For instance, the LIBOR fixing 
mechanism is a process whereby banks are asked to submit rates according to the 
following criteria: ‘At what rate could you borrow funds, where you to do so by 
asking for and then accepting interbank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 
11 am?’ 5  The individual LIBOR submissions are subjectively chosen and not 
necessarily interest rates at which transactions have taken place. Nonetheless, the 
LIBOR question highlights that the price (i.e. the interest rate) is the critical aspect. It 
is neither the volume (‘reasonable market size’) nor the time when this price is 
determined (‘just prior to 11 am’). The emphasis on the price is similar for EURIBOR 
(Euro Interbank Offered Rate), TIBOR (Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate) and other 
money market benchmarks.  
 
The LIBOR investigations, and the subsequent regularly reform process did not result 
in a change of the definition of LIBOR. Instead, strict regulation and supervision were 
introduced to ensure the benchmark, as a price, became less susceptible to 
manipulation. This is not surprising. After all, central to the controversy was the 
impact LIBOR ‘prices’ had on other prices, such as LIBOR-indexed derivatives, 
bonds, corporate loans etc. 
 
In 2014, more than a handful of global banks were fined for their manipulative and 
collusive practices in FX markets.6 A significant portion (but by no means all) of the 
misconduct related to the world’s most widely used FX benchmark: the WM/Reuters 
4 p.m. fix. In contrast to LIBOR, the WM/Reuters 4 p.m. fix is based on actual 
trading by market participants just before and after the time of fixing (the ‘fixing 
window’).7 A rule change in February 2015 involved a widening of the fixing window 
from one minute to five minutes. In addition, a broader range of price sources is now 
used to generate the benchmark. Designed to act as a snapshot of the state of the 
market at a specific time of the day, subsequent reforms to the benchmark generation 
process have followed a similar logic to that of LIBOR. The focus has been on 
ensuring that the price outcome is fair, robust and professionally determined. Whether 




Prices are, of course, crucial, and so are price-based measures of liquidity. However, 
as market makers know, all three forms of market liquidity are important – and they 
are often inseparable. Therefore, disregarding the aspects of volume and speed can 
result in misleading assessments of the actual liquidity in the market. At worst, it can 
lead to, and perhaps even sustain, an illusion of liquidity. This may have implications 
for the generation of benchmarks, which, in turn, affect other prices across the 
financial sector and other parts of the economy. To illustrate this process, let us study 
two examples drawn from LIBOR and FX, respectively. 
 
 
THE ILLUSION OF LIBOR LIQUIDITY 
 
At the outset, it is very challenging for end-users of LIBOR to assess whether the 
underlying market – that for unsecured term lending to banks – is liquid or not. In 
contrast to, say, stock purchases, bank transactions are not transparent in the sense 
that the activity of market participants can be scrutinised on a daily basis. 
Furthermore, due to the significant amount of credit risk involved in unsecured 
transactions, money market trading is less suitable for electronic trading platforms. As 
a consequence, the most readily observable liquidity indicator for the underlying 
market remains the indicative bid-ask spread for interbank deposits quoted on Reuters 
or Bloomberg screens. Although indicative prices often deviate from actual prices, the 
reputational damage resulting from consistently updating off-market quotes should 
make them serve as sufficient approximations. 8  In the long run, a tight spread 
indicates that the market is competitive, whereas a wide spread suggests that the 
market is relatively illiquid. 
 
The 3-month Japanese yen LIBOR serves as a good example. The benchmark has 
been remarkably low and stable (ranging from approximately 0% to 1%) for almost a 
whole generation as a result of the low inflation environment that has existed since 










Sources: Bloomberg, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and author’s calculations. Notes: monthly 20-
day moving averages. Deposits = average of Tokyo, London and New York close. 
 
 
Figure 1 shows indicative 3-month bid-ask spreads in the Japanese yen market from 
1997 to 2017. 9  Studying interbank deposits, we can see that the bid-ask spread 
gradually narrowed after the Japanese banking crisis and stayed at around five basis 
points until 2007. The financial crisis of 2007-08 then resulted in a sharp increase of 
the spread, consistent with the freeze in the money markets for major currencies. 
Following extraordinary liquidity injections by the central banks across the world, 
including the Bank of Japan, the spread narrowed but has nonetheless remained 
considerably more volatile than during the pre-crisis period. The development is 
therefore consistent with the view that the bid-ask spread tightened as money markets 
recovered after the Japanese banking crisis and became increasingly sophisticated and 
competitive – but then ballooned as interbank lending “died” in 2007.   
 
However, the derivatives market referencing the benchmark has hardly been affected 
by the liquidity swings of the underlying term money market. As can be seen, the bid-
ask spread of 1X4 spot forward rate agreements (FRAs) in Japanese yen, which 
reference the 3-month LIBOR in 1 months time, has remained tight and stable 
throughout almost the entire period. Indeed, the derivatives market can function 
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the reported global turnover in LIBOR-indexed FRAs, which soared in popularity 
during the crisis even though money markets had frozen (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Global daily turnover of FRAs (U.S. dollar millions) 
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements. Note: April every year. 
 
The main reason for the increase in volume from 2007 was, of course, the uncertainty 
of the development of LIBOR following the credit crunch. After all, a FRA is a 
derivative instrument, which is designed to hedge against and speculate on a change 
in LIBOR in the near future – and not necessarily on a change in the underlying 
market underpinning LIBOR.  
 
However, the textbook description of a FRA is that of a derivative instrument tailor-
made to speculate on short-term interest rates in the future and to provide a hedge 
against a genuine unsecured borrowing or lending need. Therefore, it would be logical 
to think that the derivatives market would suffer as a result of a less liquid term 
money market. It did not, and the example illustrates how the vast volumes traded in 
LIBOR-indexed derivatives also sustained an illusion that the underlying market was 
sufficiently active.  
 
Importantly, the market for unsecured borrowing and lending between banks did not 
disappear with the advent of the financial crisis. Very large quantities continued to be 
traded daily in all major currencies, and continue to do so. Problematically for the 
generation of reliable IBOR-benchmarks, however, this trading activity is almost 
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maturity breakdown of FRAs and unsecured deposits in the euro money market in 
2015, using data collected by the European Central Bank (ECB). 
 
Figure 3: Maturity breakdown of EUR FRAs and unsecured deposits in 2015 (%) 
 
Sources: European Central Bank and author’s calculations. 
 
As can be seen, more than 95% of the trading takes place in maturities up to 1 week. 
Hardly any turnover is reported for maturities such as three months and six months, 
which is supposed to be the underlying market for the two most widely used 
EURIBOR fixings. A similar pattern can be observed in the unsecured money markets 
for other currencies, whether they form the basis for LIBOR, TIBOR, STIBOR, 
NIBOR or other equivalent benchmarks. 
 
Give the scale of the LIBOR controversy it is logical that the initial reforms addressed 
the benchmark’s susceptibility to manipulation, rather than issues in the underlying 
money market.10 Some LIBOR-maturities were abolished from the fixing mechanism. 
Also, a selection of medium-sized currencies, which had limited trading activity in 
London, but also their own domestic money market benchmarks, were removed (such 
as the Swedish krona and the Canadian dollar). For the remaining currencies and 
maturities, provisions were then made that enabled panel banks to submit LIBOR-
rates based upon their expert judgement when the market was deemed illiquid. 
Whereas these changes made LIBOR more reliable for users of LIBOR-indexed 
derivatives, they had little, if any, impact on the market, which it was supposed to 
reflect. Regardless whether a financial benchmark is based upon transactions or 
estimates where deals ought to take place, the liquidity of the underlying market is 
















in the relevant maturities. In July 2017, Andrew Bailey, Chief Executive of the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) announced that LIBOR, in its current form, 
would disappear in 2021. The key message from the regulator was that it had found 
that ‘the underlying market that LIBOR seeks to measure – the market for unsecured 
term lending to banks – is no longer sufficiently active.’11  A crucial benchmark, 
which is “just a made-up number”, cannot survive. In the end, it was the lack of this 




THE ILLUSION OF FX LIQUIDITY 
 
The ‘LIBOR scandal’ was quickly followed by the ‘FX scandal’ when after a 
Bloomberg article with the headline ‘Traders Said to Rig Currency Rates to Profit Off 
Clients’ was released in June 2013.12 In the story, an academic is quoted saying that 
‘I’m sceptical of the ability of traders to manipulate the major currencies in a 
meaningful way given the massive size of this market […] Governments themselves 
often have a difficult time moving foreign-exchange markets through their 
interventions.’ This view of the FX market, as tremendously competitive as evidenced 
by vast volumes traded at tight interbank bid-ask spreads, broadly captured the 
perception at the time.  
 
However, transcripts released by regulators later revealed that banks were able to 
exercise their significant market power to influence the fixing. For instance, according 
to the FCA, HSBC accounted for 51% of the turnover in the GBP/USD FX spot 
market during the fixing window on one of the relevant days.13 This shows how the 
liquidity of the FX market (even for the major currency pairs) depends on which lens 
is used. Most cases in the FX scandal concerned major currency pairs traded in 
enormous volumes at tight bid-ask spreads. However, one or just a few banks had the 
ability to move the market at will and when needed. Seen from the perspective of the 
speed-dimension of liquidity, they could deliberately create a “shock” in the market. 
Although the price often recovered quickly, the activity during the 60 seconds, which 
formed the crucial fixing window, was sufficient to obtain a favourable benchmark 
fixing - to the detriment of the clients.  
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To illustrate how important all three dimensions are (price, volume and speed) let us 
use an example. Table 1 shows an overview of a dataset from the USD/JPY FX spot 
market on the Electronic Broking System (EBS) from 21:00:00 GMT on 8 September 
2010 to 20:59:59 GMT on 13 September 2010.14 USD/JPY is the second-most widely 
traded currency pair in the global FX spot market, and EBS is the most popular 
electronic trading platform for market making banks. 15  
 
Table 1: Overview of USD/JPY FX spot limit orders on EBS 8–13 September 2010 
Limit order submissions     787,213    
Total limit order amount      $1,020,022,000,000 
Bid-ask spread (mean/median)  0.0134% / 0.0119%   
Highest mid price    84.50 
Lowest mid price    83.49 
Market depth (mean / median)  $17.15 million / $14.00 million 
Sources: EBS and author’s calculations. 
 
The minimum amount allowed on EBS is $1 million, and the dataset contains 787,213 
USD/JPY limit order submissions during just three days. To put this into perspective, 
this corresponds to approximately three new orders of at least $1 million per second. 
The average bid-ask spread is exceptionally tight – not much more than 0.01% (or 
roughly 1 pip using FX terminology). Furthermore, the USD/JPY FX spot market also 
appears to be liquid regarding one of the standard measures of market depth. The 
average aggregated volume of limit orders submitted at the current best bid-ask 
spread is $17.15 million. In sum, this market looks large and liquid, which is not 
surprising given that it involves one of the major currency pairs in the FX spot 
market.  
 
However, a closer inspection illustrates how the vast limit order volume can 
strengthen the impression that the market is liquid. 
 
Table 2: Transactions, market orders and amounts 
Transactions (executed amount)  $4,546,000,000   
Transactions (number of executed trades) 3,719    
Minimum limit order size   $1,000,000   
Maximum limit order size   $250,000,000  
Proportion of small limit orders ($1 Mio) 85.41%    
Sources: EBS and author’s calculations. 
 
 
Two observations are notable from Table 2.  
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First, despite the exceptionally tight bid-ask spread, the volume traded at either side is 
surprisingly low. The actual turnover amounts to around $4.5 billion, which is 
minuscule compared to the total liquidity provided (over $1 trillion). Likewise, the 
number of executed trades (3,719) is just a fraction of the number of limit orders 
submitted (787,213).  
 
Second, although some huge limit orders (the largest is $250 million) were submitted 
during the period, the vast majority (85.41%) of the limit orders were for precisely $1 
million. This observation is consistent with other markets populated with algorithmic 
(including high-frequency) traders, which tend to contain a high proportion of limit 
orders compared to market orders, as well as a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ when it comes to 
the order size.16 As is well known from stock markets, such a race-to-the-bottom also 
involves competition in terms of speed. Machines can provide liquidity much faster 
than humans on electronic trading platforms. Importantly, however, machines can 
also withdraw liquidity much quicker than humans.  
 
Here, it is useful to refer to Harold Demsetz’ seminal article ‘The Costs of 
Transacting’ from 1968, where the author characterises the bid-ask spread as ‘the 
mark-up that is paid for predictable immediacy’ and as the cost of transacting 
‘without delay’.17 Immediately means right now. However, in terms of execution, 
humans might interpret this differently from algorithms. Suppose the total limit order 
book contains $20 million buy orders and $15 million sell orders at a particular 
moment in time. A trader then inputs a limit buy or sell order to the platform. The 
question is: how do other traders react to this new piece of information – and how 
fast? Is liquidity added, withdrawn or does it remain unchanged? This is important, as 
it is the liquidity immediately that ultimately matters. Using the time stamp of each 
limit order submission and cancellation, we can quantify if, when and by how much 
liquidity is added to or withdrawn from the other side of the order book following 
each new limit order submission. Essentially, we can see how the market reacts when 






Table 3: Change in limit order volume   
Time window (seconds)   0.1 0.2 0.5 1 5 10 60 
Change in limit buy order volume ($mio) 0.100 -0.102 -0.893 -0.971 -0.736 -0.545    0.508 
Change in limit sell order volume ($mio) 0.124 -0.095 -0.931 -0.997 -0.667 -0.478   -0.140 
Sources: EBS and author’s calculations. 
 
The FX spot market is a famously fast-paced market, and a minute is considered a 
relatively long time among market makers. As can be seen from Table 3, a new limit 
order is, on average, immediately countered with an additional liquidity provision of 
approximately $0.1 million from the opposite side of the order book. ‘Immediately’ or 
‘without delay’ is, in this case, defined as within 100 milliseconds. When the pros and 
cons of high-frequency trading are discussed, the speed-based advantage of machines 
over human is often raised. It takes around 300–400 milliseconds for a human being 
to blink, according to estimates by psychologists.18 Algorithmic traders can execute 
trades considerably faster than that. When studying the results from the USD/JPY FX 
spot dataset, we can see that the limit order book has already shrunk somewhat after 
200 milliseconds. Then, when human traders reasonably have had the chance to 
respond to the new information, the market liquidity has already deteriorated. After 
one second, the volume-based liquidity proxy has already decreased by approximately 
$1 million. Put differently, from the perspective of a human trader, “the market moves 





The LIBOR and FX controversies were, of course, different in several respects. 
LIBOR involved a money market benchmark, which is not based on actual 
transactions. The latter concerned a broader range of behavioural issues in the FX 
market and, with regards to the WM/Reuters 4 p.m. fix, actual buying and selling of 
currencies. However, it is the historical similarities, rather than the differences, 
outside the realm of misconduct that stand out: the opaqueness, the lack of regulation, 
the physical proximity of both activities on the banks’ trading floors and so on. 
Perhaps most importantly, they have shared the same traditions related to the liquidity 
provision, which has been upheld through voluntary market-making arrangements 
between banks. Often, this has been with the endorsement of the ACI (the Financial 
Markets Association), the trade organisation for dealers in the FX and money market. 
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The ACI sees such liquidity provision agreements as “logical” and that they “play an 
important role in providing support and liquidity.”19  
 
Based upon informal conventions, such agreements have tended to include 
considerations of all three dimensions of liquidity. Although increasingly less 
common, market conventions regarding standard bid-ask spreads (price-based 
liquidity) and standard amounts (volume-based liquidity) have been passed down 
from generation to generation in the foreign exchange and money markets. 20 There is 
no regulatory requirement preventing a market maker from quoting an unreasonably 
wide two-way price, nor a market taker from requesting a quote in an abnormally 
large amount. However, it would be seen as unprofessional. To some degree, the same 
can said about the speed-dimension of liquidity provision. According to the 2009-
version of the ACI Model Code “[…], a dealer has to assume that a price given to a 
voice/traditional broker is good only for a short length of time, typically a matter of 
seconds.”21 This highlights how the speed-based boundaries of humans can influence 
trading etiquette. A convention regarding how to measure ‘immediacy’, or how long a 
quoted price at any moment in time is deemed to be valid, shapes expectations of 
market liquidity in the future.  
 
Problematically, such liquidity provision also encourages human communication 
among competitors. This, coupled with the history of market-making banks 
simultaneously acting as principals and agents (as well as benchmark submitters and 
users), generates an array of potential anti-trust issues and conflicts of interests. The 
LIBOR and FX controversies laid these bare, and the latest reforms have addressed 
associated issues – most lately via the new EU Benchmark Regulation (BMR) and the 
new voluntary FX Global Code.22 Electronic, rather than human, order execution has 
increasingly been promoted, too, in part to circumvent potential issues related to 
conflicts of interest and the sharing of information among human traders, brokers and 
salespeople.  
 
So what lessons, if any, can be learned by paying attention to illusions of liquidity 
concerning LIBOR and FX?  
 
 14 
First, the transition away from LIBOR (and other equivalent benchmarks) is likely to 
be considerably more difficult than originally thought. Paradoxically, the LIBOR-
indexed derivatives market has become too large compared to the underlying money 
market to enable a smooth amendment of benchmark used. However, the challenge 
lies not only in finding a suitable and robust alternative reference rate. It also needs to 
be underpinned by a market with consistent liquidity provision by market participants.  
 
Second, recent financial crises and ‘flash crashes’ provide evidence of how the 
stability of the global financial system has become highly susceptible to sudden 
changes in, and ultra-fast transmission of shared perceptions of risk (BIS, 2017). A 
recent example is the Pound Flash Crash in October 2016, which showed how market 
liquidity might evaporate suddenly and without any macroeconomic causes.23 Within 
less than half an hour, the GBP/USD FX spot rate dropped by around 9% and, 
according to researchers at the FCA, the bid-ask spread saw a 60-fold increase.24 The 
FX market is international by definition and lacks circuit breakers. Liquidity 
withdrawal en masse, regardless of whether it is human or algorithmic, can pose 
systemic risks and therefore have severe consequences for societies at large.  
 
To ensure fair and effective financial markets going forward, and to be able to 
withstand and prevent future shocks, a multi-dimensional approach to the concept of 
market liquidity is required. This is particularly important for OTC markets and 
financial benchmarks linked to these, which ultimately depend on human 
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